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Abstract
Constitutional arrangements aﬀect the decisions made by a society. We study how
this eﬀect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this
has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Con-
stitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly
diﬀerent voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deﬁne an equilibrium
notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable
constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only
self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always ex-
ist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for
some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the
constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously
simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable
rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that
use majority rule for ordinary business.
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1 Introduction
Diﬀerent societies use diﬀerent rules to make collective choices. Moreover, societies often
use diﬀerent rules to decide on diﬀerent types of issues. We oﬀer a theory that accounts for
this diversity. Speciﬁcally, we show why some constitutions will be stable over time, while
others will not, and we also show how this relates to the structure of the society.
Societies realize that change is inevitable, and they usually (but not always) build rules
for amendment into their constitutions. From this point of view, it is clear that a constitution
is a choice of a society, and a choice that may be revisited over time. As such, in order to
be able to make any meaningful predictions about the types of constitutions that we should
expect to see in the world, we need a theory about which constitutions will survive over
time, given that they are subject under their own rules to amendments.
Thus, simply put, in this paper we study the constitutions that can be considered as
equilibrium constitutions. More explicitly, we name these “self- stable” constitutions, to
emphasize the idea that change is governed by the constitution itself.
It is important to emphasize that our goal is not to say which constitutions are better
than others, nor to explain why a society allows for amendments or ﬂexibility, nor why a
society picks one constitution over another. Our goal is simply to provide a theory of which
constitutions can survive over time, and which ones cannot. With this said, there are types
of constitutions that are particularly prominent in the world (for instance, involving majority
rule) that are worthy of special attention in understanding when they are self-stable, and
when they are not.
Our study begins with the most basic form of constitution that one could imagine. It
is simply a speciﬁcation of a voting rule. The idea is that under such a constitution, any
decisions that the society will make, including voting over changes to the constitution, will
be governed by that voting rule. There we identify suﬃcient conditions for such simple
constitutions to be self-stable, but also ﬁnd that there are conditions under which no such
constitution is self-stable.
This then turns our attention to a slightly more complicated form constitution, that
might be thought of as a stylized version of what one sees in the world. The idea is that
the constitution speciﬁes a voting rule for passing new legislation, except when it comes to
”special” types of proposals. For such special proposals - in particular amendments to the
constitution - a diﬀerent voting rule is used. For example, many societies take decisions by
majority rule, but require a two-thirds majority to amend the constitution. For instance,
the U.S. Senate uses majority rule, and a 67/100 rule to change the senate rules. In fact,
under the ﬁlibusters that are possible in the senate, one needs 60/100 votes to call a vote
and so the eﬀective voting rule might be thought of as a (60%,67%) constitution rather than
a (50%,67%) constitution. An interesting (unstable) example arose recently in California.
Under the law until 2000, school bond and tax issues required a 2/3 majority of the par-
ticipating voters to pass. So we might think of these votes as having the basic voting rule
be 2/3 of the voters. However, propositions (initiatives that may be placed on the ballot
through a variety of means) in California may be passed with a 1/2 majority. In particular,
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one can place a proposition on the ballot which changes the vote required on such issues.
Thus, one can amend the state’s voting rule by a 1/2 vote. In fact in the 2000 election,
Proposition 39 suggested changing the voting rule on school bond and tax issues from 2/3 to
55%. Interestingly, Proposition 39 passed with 53.4% (as reported by the Secretary of State
of California) of the vote. Having a 2/3 majority voting rule that can be amended by a 1/2
vote is inherently unstable.
Our analysis shows that some of these more complicated constitutions that involve sepa-
rate voting rules for standard decisions and for amendments, are always self-stable. But we
also ﬁnd that even very natural constitutions, like the one-half, two-thirds described above,
may fail to be self-stable under some circumstances. More importantly, we determine exactly
how self-stability hinges on the preferences over rules that are held by the citizens, and we
show that these preferences are endogenously determined by each citizen’s assessment of his
or her relative position in the political spectrum.
To insist on the relevance of our analysis, we emphasize that special majorities are often
required by constitutions on many diﬀerent issues, and not only in order to make amendments
to the constitution. For example, the Council of the European Union makes decisions by
qualiﬁed majority on an increasing list of subjects. Our theory also explains why, for any
given family of issues, qualiﬁed majorities may be desired by voters, whether or not sustained
by further constitutional arrangements. Because of that, it is also interesting to study the
stability of qualiﬁed majority rules, for the case where no special provisions are made to
change them. A striking example of a situation when the standard rule is explicitly stated
to be the one required for rule change is provided by the draft Constitution proposed by the
Convention of the EU. The second paragraph of article 24.4 reads as follows: ”Where the
Constitution provides in Part III for the Council of Ministers to act unanimously in a given
area, the European Council can adopt, on its own initiative and by unanimity, a European
decision allowing the Council of Ministers to act by qualiﬁed majority in that area”.
We are aware that any simple explanation of a phenomenon as complex as the choice of a
constitution can only be partial. Many factors other than self- stability inﬂuence the choice
and the persistence of constitutional arrangements. Nevertheless, self-stability is a central
property that one needs to understand in order to develop a robust theory of constitutions.
It is important to reﬂect on this property, which seems to have passed unnoticed in the liter-
ature, and yet formalizes an equilibrium requirement that one should expect to be satisﬁed
by any persistent set of rules.
The Related Literature
Constitutional design and properties of voting rules are topics that have been extensively
studied in political science and social choice theory, dating to the classics, such as Rousseau
(1762) who explicitly discussed how the size of a majority required in a voting rule should be
related to the importance of the question at hand.1 Buchanan and Tullock (1962) were the
1Some recent references from the large literature that relates to issues regarding majority size includes
Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988), Austen-Smith and Banks (1997), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), and Das-
gupta and Maskin (1998).
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ﬁrst to raise the issue of choosing how to choose, and they raise it explicitly in the context
of constitutional design. To quote from their work (page 6):
“When we recognize that “constitutional” decisions themselves, which are necessarily
collective, may also be reached under any of several decision-making rules, the same issue is
confronted all over again. Moreover, in postulating a decision making rule for constitutional
choices, we face the same problem when we ask: How is the rule itself chosen?”
While Buchanan and Tullock raise the issue of choosing how to choose, they end up
stepping around it and instead focussing on the role of full consent in decision making,
including decisions regarding constitutional choice. In contrast, the approach that we take
here addresses this problem of choosing constitutions head-on.
Recent research on constitutional structure (for instance, Persson and Tabellini (2000),
Persson (2002), and Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2002)) advances both theoretical arguments
and empirical tests stressing the importance of constitutional arrangements for economic
performance, as well as feedback from the economy on political institutions. Our work is
wholly theoretical analysis and one with a complementary focus, namely on understanding
which political institutions will be stable. As emphasized by Persson in his EEA presidential
address (Stockholm, August 2003), there is room and need for both theoretical and empirical
approaches in the long road towards a full grasp of these interactions.
The model of voter uncertainty that we work with was ﬁrst proposed in the early nineteen
seventies in a series of brilliant papers (most of which are collected in a volume edited by
Niemi and Weisberg (1972), and discussed in what follows), inspired by a seminal work of
Rae (1969), whose purpose was to justify the use of majority rule. Some of our results
reinforce the idea that majority rule is special. 2 In particular, it emerges as the natural rule
for day-to-day decisions in self- stable constitutions, coupled with an adequate supermajority
for the change of rules (see Theorems 4 and 5). Yet, our analysis also clariﬁes that other
majority sizes may be self-stable in cases where simple majority would not be.
Koray (2000) is an important predecessor to ours on the subject of a choice of voting
rules. Koray outlines a method for viewing social choice functions themselves as alternatives,
so that one can ask whether a social choice function always selects itself. He shows that given
enough richness of preferences the only self-selective social choice functions are dictatorial.
This diﬀers in key ways from our self-stability and impossibility results are not an issue in
our analysis. We end up with dramatic diﬀerences in the model and the results, so that the
only real tie between our study and Koray’s is in the common interest of endogenizing the
way in which societies make choices.3
2Due to its salience, majority rule has been analyzed and justiﬁed from very diﬀerent angles. Condorcet
(1785) provided a classical justiﬁcation for its use through what is now called the Condorcet Jury Theorem
(see also Young and Levenglick (1978)). Another type of justiﬁcation comes from axiomatic analysis ( May
(1952)). Our approach diﬀers from the axiomatic, because we treat the decision rules as choice variables,
and from the Jury Theorem approach because our voters may have conﬂicting objectives.
3Here are some of the main diﬀerences. First, our concept of self-stability only requires that a voting rule
should not be beaten by another rule when the given rule is used, which is diﬀerent from saying that a rule
must select itself. Another way to say this is that in our setting there is a special standing to the status-quo
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We ﬁnish by mentioning some recent work directly related to voting over voting rules and
to our approach. A paper by Sosnowska (2002) extends the model that we develop here to
consider weighted voting rules, a paper by Wakayama (2002) extends the model to allow for
abstention, and Coelho (2002) considers notions of maximin in place of self-stability. Maggi
and Morelli (2003) study such voting in international organizations. Polborn and Messner
(2002) consider the choice of voting rules and self-stability in the context of an overlapping
generations models where diﬀerences in cohort size and voting rules aﬀect the passage of
reforms that involve costs and delayed beneﬁts.
2 Deﬁnitions
Voters and Alternatives
N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of voters.
The voters will face votes over pairs alternatives. We denote the terms of these pairwise
choices as a and b. Alternative a is interpreted as the status-quo. Alternative b is interpreted
as a change.
Voting Rules
Each voter casts a vote in {a, b}.
A voting rule is characterized by a number s ∈ {1, . . . , n}.4 If at least s voters say “b”
then b is elected, and a is elected otherwise.
Some examples of voting rules are as follows.
If s = 1, then b is elected whenever there is at least one voter for change, and so a is
elected only when it is unanimously supported.
If s = n, then b is elected if there is unanimous support for change, and a is elected as
soon as at least one a voter supports it.
If n is odd and s = n+1
2
or n is even and s = n
2
+ 1, then the voting rule is the standard
majority rule.5
As majority rule is referred to at several points in what follows we denote it by smaj.
Thus, smaj = n+1
2
if n is odd and smaj = n
2
+ 1 if n is even.
alternative, which can provide an asymmetry not present in the more abstract social choice setting analyzed
by Koray. Second, the underlying setting here considers votes over two (possibly uncertain) alternatives at
a time, rather than making selections from three or more (known) alternatives.
4Allowing for s = 0 or s = n+ 1 results in degenerate voting rules that always choose b or always choose
a, respectively. We focus on rules where there is a real choice to be made.
5When n is even, there are two possible choices: n2 and
n
2 +1 depending on which alternative wins in the
case of a tie. For simplicity, we break ties in favor of the status quo in this case. None of the analysis that
follows is dependent on tie-breaking conventions.
5
Note that our deﬁnition of a voting rule presumes anonymity. We discuss this property
in the concluding remarks.
Voter Preferences
Voters have preferences over voting rules, as the voting rule will aﬀect the future of the
society. Let voter i’s preferences over voting rules be represented by the utility function
Ui : {1, . . . , n} → IR where Ui(s) represents voter i’s utility for voting rule s.
In the next section, we analyze voters’ preferences in detail. For the purposes of introduc-
ing our deﬁnitions of self-stability, it is suﬃcient simply to know that voters have preferences
over voting rules.
Self-Stable Voting Rules
A voting rule s is self-stable (for society p) if #{i | Ui(s′) > Ui(s)} < s for every s′ = s.
The property of self-stability ensures that a given voting rule would be robust to change
if used for making decisions.
We should emphasize that self-stability may be thought of as an equilibrium concept. As
with many equilibrium concepts, we do not model how one reaches equilibrium, nor do we
model how the world might select among equilibria if there are several. What we can say is
that a self-stable rule would stay in place if reached, while other rules would tend not to.
Self-Stable Constitutions
We also explore the consequences of admitting constitutions that allow for diﬀerent voting
rules to be used for making diﬀerent types of decisions. A constitution can specify one voting
rule to be used on all issues except for the change of this voting rule, where a diﬀerent rule
may be used.
A constitution is a pair of voting rules (s, S), where s is to be used in votes over the
issues a, b and S is to be used in any votes regarding changes from s to any other rule s′. 6
A constitution (s, S)) is self-stable if #{i |Ui(s′) > Ui(s)} < S for any s′.
Self-stability of a constitution requires that the preferences of voters be such that there
does not exist a voting rule s′ that would defeat the constitution’s prescribed voting rule
s to be used for choices over issues, when these two voting rules are compared under the
constitution’s voting rule S, to be used for choices over rules. So, a self-stable constitution
is one that would not be changed once in place.
The main focus of this paper is to say something about which voting rules and constitu-
tions are self-stable. The idea is that these are the only rules that will survive in the long
run in a society, and so it makes sense to understand what they look like.
6As pointed out to us by Randy Calvert, one could also think of a more general nesting of rules, where
one thinks of a voting rule S′ to amend (s, S), and so on; and it might be interesting to consider when these
may be truncated (as eﬀectively the case of a pair means that the same S is used for all higher orders).
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3 Induced Preferences over Voting Rules
In order to say something about self-stability, it is important to understand the structure of
voters’ preferences over voting rules.
Timing and Uncertainty
Let us consider a two period world. As we argue shortly, this easily extends to an inﬁnite
horizon model.
In period 2, a vote will be taken over two decisions a and b. At this time, each voter
knows his or her preferences over a and b.
In period 1, voters do not yet know their preferences over a and b. A voter can be
characterized by a probability pi ∈ (0, 1), that he or she will prefer b to a at the time of the
vote.7
The realizations of voters’ support for the alternatives are independent. For instance,
the probability that voters 1 and 2 support b while voter 3 supports a is p1p2(1− p3).
A voter gets utility 1 if his preferred alternative is chosen in the vote, and utility 0
otherwise.8
This sort of uncertainty was ﬁrst considered in Badger (1972) and Curtis (1972), and we
will make use of some of their results about voter preferences in what follows.
The society of voters is represented by a set of voters N and a vector p = (p1, . . . , pn).
In what follows, we treat the society (N, p) as given and so will often suppress the fact
that preferences will depend on these parameters, except where we want to speciﬁcally point
out this dependence.
The Timing of Voting
In this world, a vote over the alternatives a and b will take place in period 2. There
are two diﬀerent times at which a vote over voting rules could be taken and conceivably be
relevant. The ﬁrst is in period 1 where voters do not yet know their preferences over the
alternatives (but know the pi’s). The second is in period 2, just before the vote over the
alternatives, at a time where voters know which alternatives they support.9
The only votes over voting rules that are of any interest turn out to be in period 1, as
votes over voting rules in period 2 are of no consequence. This is easily seen as follows.
Suppose that the voting rule is s at the beginning of period 2. Let x be the number of voters
7Extensions to the case where pi can be 0 or 1 are straightforward. These cases complicate some of the
calculations and proofs when we divide by pi or 1− pi, but are still easily directly handled as special cases.
To keep an uncluttered exposition, we leave the cases where pi = 0 or 1 to the interested reader.
8This presumes that a voter cares as much for getting change when preferring change over the status quo,
as the voter cares for preserving the status-quo when preferring the status quo over change. We discuss the
role of this assumption in detail in the concluding remarks.
9One could also conceive of voting over voting rules at some time 0, say “behind the veil of ignorance”
and before the pi’s are known. This might set a starting point for the evolution of the voting rule, but the
only rules that would survive past period 1 would be self-stable ones. And so, that is our focus.
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who support a, and n− x be the number of voters who support b. If n− x ≥ s, then b will
pass under voting rule s. In this case, these n− x voters will be happy with the voting rule
s and would want to change it to any voting rule that would lead b not to pass. Since there
are n− x ≥ s such voters, no voting rule that could make a diﬀerence could defeat s. Next,
consider the case where n− x < s. In this case, the n− x voters who prefer b would like to
lower the voting quota to some s′ < s, so they could get b to pass. However, the remaining
x voters would prefer to keep s as it is, because they prefer a to b. Thus, these voters would
vote against any such change, and again the voting rule would not be changed in any way
that could make a diﬀerence.
Thus, we have argued that the only interesting votes over voting rules have to come at
a time where voters are still uncertain about their preferences over alternatives. Therefore,
in what follows, we analyze the preferences and votes over voting rules at period 1, when
voters know their pi’s but do not yet know their realized preferences over the alternatives.
Induced Preferences over Voting Rules
Given the likelihood of diﬀerent patterns of support for a and b, a voter can calculate
his or her expected utility (at time period 1) under each voting rule s. Let Ui(s) be the
expected utility of voter i if voting rule s is used. This is expressed as follows. For any
k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, let Pi(k) denote the probability that exactly k of the individuals in
N \ {i} support the change. We can write
Pi(k) =
∑
C⊂N\{i}:|C|=k
×j∈Cpj ×/∈C (1− p). (1)
and
Ui(s) = pi
n−1∑
k=s−1
Pi(k) + (1− pi)
s−1∑
k=0
Pi(k). (2)
Single Peaked Preferences
The usual deﬁnition of single-peaked preferences requires that all alternatives can be
ranked from left to right, that one alternative ŝ is best, and that the alternatives that one
encounters by moving leftward (or rightward) away from ŝ are considered worse and worse.
Our deﬁnition here will be slightly weaker, as it allows a voter to have two peaks.10 In
particular, it is possible that Ui(ŝ) = Ui(ŝ − 1). For instance, in a society where n is even
and each pi = p for all i, all individuals will be indiﬀerent between n/2 and n/2 + 1.
Ui is single-peaked if there exists ŝ ∈ {1, . . . , n} with Ui(ŝ) ≥ Ui(s) for all s ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that Ui(s) > Ui(s− 1) for any ŝ > s > 1 and Ui(s− 1) > Ui(s) for any n ≥ s > ŝ.
Let ŝi denote the peak of voter i.
10These could be referred to as single-plateaued preferences following the literature. However, given that
such indiﬀerence can only occur between two points and happens non-generically (in p) we stick with the
term single-peaked.
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In the case where a voter has twin-peaks, the deﬁnition above selects the higher of the
two peaks as ŝi. This is simply a convention and does not matter in any of the results that
follow.
The following result is due to Badger (1972). We include a proof in the appendix, for
completeness.
Lemma 1 [Badger (1972)] For any society (profile of pi’s), every voter’s preferences over
voting rules are single-peaked.
The following example gives some insight into voters’ preferences over voting rules.
Example 1 Single-Peaked Preferences
Let us consider a simple society where agents can be divided into two diﬀerent groups,
N1 = {1, . . . , 4} and N2 = {5, . . . , 10}, where the pi of each voter i in group 1 is p1 = .01
and in group 2 is p2 = .99.
In this society, the corresponding peaks of preferences over voting rules are ŝ1 = 8 and
ŝ2 = 4.
Let us examine why ŝ2 = 4, as this will help us to understand preferences more generally.
This can be veriﬁed by direct calculations, but also can be seen in an intuitive manner. Let
us consider a voter in N2. Consider a scenario where exactly three voters end up supporting
change. Given the extreme values of p1 = .01 and p2 = .99, if there are three voters who end
up supporting change, it is very likely that all of those voters are from N2. Given that there
are six voters in N2 this leads to a probability of nearly 1/2 that a voter in N2 would assign to
supporting change conditional on three voters supporting change. Although this probability
is nearly 1/2, it is still less than 1/2 due to the small probability that some of the voters in
N1 will be among those supporting change. So, a voter in N2 will prefer that society choose
the status quo conditional on three voters supporting change. If we consider a scenario
where exactly four voters end up supporting change, then the conditional probability that
a voter in N2 would assign to being one of the supporters of change is nearly 2/3. Since it
is above 1/2, a voter in N2 will prefer that society choose change conditional on four voters
supporting change. Given these two observations it follows that ŝ2 = 4. Similar reasoning
leads to ŝ1 = 8.
Generally we can think of a voter considering each possible scenario of numbers of sup-
porters for each of the alternatives. For each scenario the voter determines which group
they are more likely to fall in. The voter’s most preferred voting rule (ŝi) corresponds to the
scenario with the smallest sized group supporting change for which the voter ﬁnds it more
likely that he or she will support change. We can see that if the voting rule is raised or
lowered from 4, then there will be some scenarios where the choice will be made in favor of
the group that the voter ﬁnds it less likely that he or she will fall in. This is the explanation
for why we see single-peaked preferences. We can also see why it is rare for a voter to have
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twin peaks - as that can only happen in a case where the voter assigns probability of exactly
1/2 to each of the two groups in some scenario.
Intermediate Preferences and Single Crossing
While Lemma 1 tells us that each voter’s preferences over voting rules have the nice prop-
erty of single-peakedness, the following lemma tells us about how diﬀerent voters’ preferences
are related to each other. There are two properties that are useful in noting.
A society of voters has preferences satisfying the single crossing property if for any i and
j with pj ≥ pi,
Ui(s)− Ui(s′) ≥ Uj(s)− Uj(s′)
for all s ≥ s′.
As we shall see, the single crossing property is satisﬁed in this model. The single crossing
property allows us to order preferences over voting rules in terms of the pi’s; but more
importantly also implies that the preferences are intermediate.
A society of voters has intermediate preferences if for any i, j, k with pj ≥ pk ≥ pi:
• Ui(s) ≥ Ui(s′) and Uj(s) ≥ Uj(s′) imply that Uk(s) ≥ Uk(s′), and
• Ui(s) > Ui(s′) and Uj(s) > Uj(s′) imply that Uk(s) > Uk(s′).
Intermediate preferences are usually deﬁned by requiring that there exists some ordering
over individuals so that when two individuals have the same ranking over two alternatives,
then individuals between them in the ordering have that same ranking (e.g., see Grandmont
(1978)). Here the natural ordering over individuals is in terms of their pi’s, the distinguishing
characteristic of voters, and so we take the shortcut of deﬁning intermediate preferences
directly in terms of that ordering. Hence, a society will have intermediate preferences over
voting rules if whenever two voters with pi and pj agree on how to rank two rules s and s
′,
then all voters with probabilities pk between pi and pj will also agree on the way to rank
these two rules. The simple model we are considering has the following strong feature.
Lemma 2 Every society has preferences over voting rules that satisfy the single crossing
property and are intermediate.
The proof of Lemma 2 appears in the appendix. The intuition for why the voters’ peaks
over voting rules follow an inverse order to the voters pi’s (Corollary 1 below), is fairly
straightforward, as voters with higher pi’s are more likely to favor change and thus will be
in favor of a lower quota than voters who are less likely to favor change. While ordering the
peaks is intuitive and useful, we emphasize that Lemma 2 has much stronger implications,
as it relates preferences over arbitrary values of s and s′, including those falling on opposite
sides of a set of voters’ peaks. This additional structure will also be useful in what follows.
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The proof of these aspects of preferences builds inductively from preferences over adjacent
voting rules, and involves direct comparison of the expressions of diﬀerences in expected
utilities for diﬀerent voters. Details are in the appendix.
As just mentioned above, Lemma 2 has the following useful corollary (see the proof of
Lemma 2).
Corollary 1 For any society, ŝi ≥ ŝj whenever pj ≥ pi.
There are some other facts about the location of the voters’ peaks that are worth em-
phasizing. The relative ordering of pi’s is not only important in determining the relative
ordering over the ŝi’s, but it is also critical in determining the actual values of the ŝi’s. This
is seen in the following lemma, which states that regardless of p, there is always some voter
who has a peak at least as high as smaj and some other voter who has a peak no higher than
smaj.
Lemma 3 For any society there exist i and j such that ŝi ≥ smaj ≥ ŝj.
The proof of Lemma 3 is based on the following reasoning. The unique maximizer of∑
i Ui(s) is s
maj, since smaj chooses the alternative that will result in the largest group of
voters who get utility 1 for each realization of preferences over a and b (see the concluding
remarks). Thus, if some voter’s expected utility is increased by moving to an s that is higher
than smaj, then some other voter’s expected utility must fall as the result of such a move.
The same is true in reverse. So there is at least one voter with a peak at least as high as
smaj and at least one voter with a peak no higher than smaj. The complete proof, taking into
account the possibility of twin-peaks appears in the appendix.
Note that by combining Corollary 1 with Lemma 3, we know that the voter who has the
highest pi must have a ŝi which is no higher than s
maj and the voter who has the lowest pi
must have a ŝi that is at least as high as s
maj, and this is true regardless of p.
Finally, we also note the following lemma due to Badger (1972) and Curtis (1972), and
ﬁrst conjectured by Rae (1969). It singles out majority rule as a rule of special interest.
Lemma 4 [Badger (1972), Curtis (1972)] For any society (profile of pi’s), the only voting
rules that maximize the sum of voters’ expected utilities is smaj if n id odd, and smaj and
smaj − 1 if n is even.
While the proofs of Badger (1972) and Curtis (1972) are involved, there is a very easy
way to prove Lemma 4. Given any realization of voters’ preferences at time 2, the choice
which maximizes the realized total utility is simply to choose the alternative preferred by
a majority. Given that this is the best that one can do realization by realization, it is
maximizing in total expectation as well. Any rule other than majority rule (except n
2
when
n is even) realizes a lower total utility at some realization of preferences as it will select one
of the alternatives when a minority supports it, and thus we have the uniqueness claim.
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4 Self-Stability
With some understanding of voters’ preferences over voting rules under our belts, we examine
the issue of existence of self-stable voting rules and constitutions in some detail.
Existence of Self-Stable Voting Rules
We begin by considering the special case where all voters have the same pi. This is
of some interest where this common p is an indicator of the average propensity to favor
change of a society’s representative voter. It is also worth considering as an exercise, since
the reasoning required for this simple case extends to the analysis of more heterogeneous
societies. Moreover, the conclusion we reach may seem counterintuitive at ﬁrst, although it
is easy to reach after some reﬂection. The following result is a corollary of Lemmas 1 and 3.
Theorem 1 If pi = pj for all i and j, then s
maj is the unique self-stable voting rule if n is
odd. If n is even, then there are two self-stable rules smaj and smaj − 1.
Thus, majority rule is the unique self-stable voting rule whenever all voters have the same
probability of choosing change, irrespective of what this probability might be. One might
have guessed that societies where all voters are very likely to want changes would prefer low
values of s, that is low barriers to change, and that homogeneously conservative societies
would favor high values of s. But this is not the case. Actually, in homogeneous societies,
all voters have their peak at ŝi = s
maj , and thus majority rule is the consensus choice of
rule. What actually matters is not the absolute values of the p’s but their values relative to
those of other voters. For instance, consider a society where pi = .01 for each i and so voters
are very conservative and very likely to support the status-quo. In this case, shouldn’t it be
that voters all prefer a high quota s as they each know they are likely to support the status
quo? The answer is no and the reasoning lies in the answer to the following question. Which
alternative would a voter prefer society to choose in a generic realization where k voters end
up supporting a and n− k voters end up supporting b? That is, the voter can think of the
diﬀerent scenarios possible for numbers of voters supporting a and b, and then ask which
side he is most likely to fall on in each scenario. Given the symmetry in pi’s, conditional
on this realization of preferences it is most likely that the voter is in the larger of the two
groups. So, the voter would like society to choose a in scenarios where k > n−k and society
to choose b in scenarios where k < n − k, and is indiﬀerent if k = n − k. Thus, the voter
would like society to choose in favor of the majority as that is where the voter is most likely
to be in any realization. Once one understands the above reasoning, then Lemma 3 and the
importance of relative comparisons becomes clear.
Theorem 1 oﬀers an encouraging starting point, as we ﬁnd that not only does a self-stable
voting rule exist, but actually the unique such rule is the eﬃcient majority rule.
Unfortunately, the substantial symmetry in a homogeneous society is responsible for the
nice conclusion of the result. In more heterogeneous societies, one can lose majority rule as
being self-stable, and one can also lose existence of a self-stable voting rule altogether.
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To see an example where there exist self-stable voting rules, but where majority rule is
not self-stable, reconsider Example 1. Recall that the society in that example consisted of
two groups of voters, N1 = {1, . . . , 4} and N2 = {5, . . . , 10}, where the corresponding peaks
of preferences over voting rules were ŝ1 = 8 and ŝ2 = 4. There, {7, 8} is the set of self-stable
voting rules. It is easy to see that 8 is self-stable as only group N2 would like to change
voting rules if 8 is used, but then they only have 6 members and so are too small to make
the change under a rule of 8. The same is true of quota 7, and although in that case group
N1 would like to raise the quota from 7 to 8 it is too small to do so. To see that no other
rule is stable, note that 4 is unanimously preferred to any smaller rule, and 8 is unanimously
preferred to any larger rule. So the only other candidates for self-stability are the quotas 4,
5, and 6. However, 5 and 6 are not stable because N2 prefers 4 and has enough voters to
move the quota to 4. 4 is not stable since group N1 would have enough voters to increase
the quota.
As we will see in Theorem 2, existence of a self-stable voting rule is guaranteed in a
society where there are only two diﬀerent types of voters. However, as the following example
shows, existence can fail in a society with three or more types of voters.
Example 2 A Society for which No Rule is Self Stable.
N = {1, . . . , 5}. p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/2, p4 = 3/8, and p5 = 3/16.
Direct calculations lead to ŝ1 = ŝ2 = ŝ3 = 2, ŝ4 = 3 and ŝ5 = 4. Let us verify that
there is no self-stable voting procedure. All voters want to raise the quota from 1 and lower
it from 5. That leaves the quotas of 2,3, and 4 to be checked as the only possibilities for
self-stable voting rules. Voters 1 to 3 would vote to lower it from 3 to 2, voters 1 to 4 would
vote to lower it from 4 to 3, and voters 3 and 4 would vote to raise it from 2 to 3. Thus, no
voting rule is self-stable.
The possibility that a society may not have a self-stable voting rule is striking. In order to
understand its implications, it is worth discussing more extensively when this phenomenon
can or cannot occur.
There is actually much that we can deduce about the existence and properties of self-
stable rules, and we collect some of this in Theorem 2. Before we state the theorem, we
introduce some useful deﬁnitions.
A society (N, p) is dichotomous if there exists N1 = ∅, p1 ∈ (0, 1), N2 = ∅, and p2 ∈ (0, 1)
such that N = N1 ∪N2, pi = p1 for all i ∈ N1, pi = p2 for all i ∈ N1.
A dichotomous society is thus one that can be divided into two groups such that members
of the same group have the same pi’s, as in Example 1.
Say that a society is symmetric if when voters are labeled such that pi ≥ pj when i > j,
it follows that pi = 1− pn−i.
Let ŝmed denote the median of (ŝ1, . . . , ŝn), i.e., the median of the peaks of the voters.
Theorem 2 (1) If ŝmed ≥ smaj, then ŝmed is self-stable.
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(2) If there does not exist a self-stable voting rule for a society (N, p), then there exists a
self-stable voting rule for the society (N, p), where p is defined by pi = 1− pi for each
i. Moreover, ŝmed is self-stable for society (N, p).
(3) A dichotomous society has at least one self-stable voting rule.
(4) If a society is symmetric, then smaj is a self-stable voting rule.
Let us sketch the proof of Theorem 2 here, and we collect details in the appendix.
To see (1), note that if ŝmed ≥ smaj, then at most half of the population would like to
lower the rule below the median, and at most half would like to increase it above the median.
Since ŝmed ≥ smaj ≥ n+12 , it follows that ŝmed be self-stable.
The proof of (2) follows from the observation that the setting we are examining is symmet-
ric in the following way: if in society (N, p) voter i would like society to choose b conditional
only on knowing that s voters out of society favor b, then in society (N, p) voter i would like
society to choose a conditional only on knowing that s voters out of society favor a. This
implies that if ŝi is i’s peak under society (N, p), then n − ŝi + 1 is i’s peak under society
(N, p). To establish (2), note that non-existence of a self-stable voting rule implies that ŝmed
is no larger than n
2
, as otherwise it would be self-stable. The reasoning above then implies
that ŝmed for society (N, p) is larger than
n
2
, and so is stable.
(4), which asserts the existence of self-stable voting rules for symmetric societies, is an
easy corollary of (2).
The proof of (3) is the most complicated of the four. It appears in the appendix and
involves explicit examination of voters’ conditional probabilities that they will support al-
ternative b if k voters support b. Very roughly, it works by relating the conditional beliefs
of the two groups to each other. Let N1, N2, n1, n2, ŝ1, and ŝ2 be the two groups of voters,
the cardinalities of these groups, and their peaks, respectively. The main case that has to be
ruled out to establish existence is where n2 ≥ ŝ1 and n1 ≥ ŝ2, when ŝ1 = ŝ2.11 If the beliefs
of N1 are such that n2 ≥ ŝ1, this means that the voters in N1 have relatively high beliefs that
they will be among the supporters of b. This implies that the voters in N2 have relatively
low beliefs that they will be among the supporters of b, and so ŝ2 will be high enough to be
larger than n1. The challenge in the proof is to show that these relative statements translate
into absolute statements about the relationship between ŝ1 and ŝ2 and their comparison to
n1 and n2.
11If, for instance, ŝ1 > n2 then ŝ1 would be self-stable. So it would have to be that both n2 ≥ ŝ1 and
n1 ≥ ŝ2 for there not to exist a self-stable rule. Without loss of generality let ŝ2 > ŝ1, as the case where
ŝ2 = ŝ1 would lead to unanimity and thus self-stability. So, to see that if a case existed where n2 ≥ ŝ1
and n1 ≥ ŝ2 when ŝ1 = ŝ2, then there would not exist a self-stable voting rule, note that there would be
unanimous support for change of any s that lies outside of the range between (and including) ŝ1 and ŝ2.
Also N1 would want to change away (and could change) from and s such that ŝ2 ≥ s > ŝ1. Finally, N2
would want to change from ŝ1.
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(2) has some powerful implications. It implies that non-existence is a problem for less
than “half” of the potential societies, in terms of the p’s. This implies that while non-
existence can occur for open sets of societies (simply build a neighborhood around Example
2), it still is a problem that is not completely pervasive.
We also note that when self-stable voting rules exist, there may be a number of them.
Moreover, the set of self-stable voting rules need not be an interval, nor need it include smaj.
These points are illustrated in the following example.
Example 3 A Society with Multiple and Non-Adjacent Self Stable Rules.
The society (N, p) is dichotomous.
N1 = {1, . . . , 5} and N2 = {6, . . . , 16} with p1 = .01 and p2 = .99.
Here ŝ1 = 14 and ŝ2 = 6.
It follows that {6, 12, 13, 14} is the set of self-stable voting rules.
It is clear that the set of self-stable voting rules will consist of a set of intervals, each of
which includes at least one ŝi. This puts an upper bound on the number of disjoint intervals
that can be included, at the number of distinct pi’s that are present in the society.
Sub-Majority Voting Rules
Before turning to the question of constitutional design, let us comment on some problems
related to the choice of majority sizes smaller than smaj.
Rules with s < smaj can be problematic in the following sense. Consider a situation
where a and b are each supported by half of the population. A vote under s will result in b
becoming the new status quo. But then, with b as the new status quo, the other half of the
voters would support (and could eﬀect) change back to a if it is proposed for a vote against
b. Thus, there is the potential to continuously cycle back and forth between a and b as the
status quo.12 This, of course, is only a potential problem of sub-majority rules.13
Suppose that a society somehow precludes itself from ever selecting a sub-majority rule.
If this is the case, then the existence of self-stable voting rules is ensured. To see this,
consider such a society. The preferences of voters over the restricted set of s’s (s ≥ smaj) are
still single peaked. Voters whose unrestricted peaks were at least smaj have the same peak
12See Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988) for a related discussion of the instability of infra-majority rules.
13Note that there are two caveats to the above noted diﬃculty with sub-majority rules. First, for some
alternatives it may not be possible to make reversals. For instance, if a is a current membership of a society
and b is a question to include a new member, it may not be permitted to later vote to revoke membership.
There are many such examples of decisions which cannot be reversed, such as a vote to tenure a faculty
member, or a vote to declare war, etc.. Second, the diﬃculty requires that one reasonably expect that the
reversed proposal be made, and so the agenda control becomes important. It may be that the agenda is
controlled in manners so that once b has been voted for, a is never again pitted as an alternative. We have
abstracted away from the agenda in our model, and a more complete analysis of the potential instability of
sub-majority rules demands a careful modeling of the agenda.
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on the restricted set, while voters whose peaks were below smaj now have smaj as a peak.
The median of the restricted peaks will be self-stable over the restricted set of voting rules.
This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 3 For any society where only s ≥ smaj are admissible voting rules, ŝmed (defined
relative to restricted preferences) is a self-stable voting rule.
Theorem 3 follows as a corollary of (1) of Theorem 2. Hence, for societies who exclude
s’s below smaj a priori, we can add self-stability to the list of properties in the literature
justifying median voting rules.
It is interesting to note that even when sub-majority rules are ruled out, it can be that
the eﬃcient rule, majority rule, is not self-stable. Actually, from (2) in Theorem 2, we can
deduce that majority rule will turn out to be self-stable in at least “half” of the societies, in
terms of the possible p’s. And we also know that smaj will not be self-stable when ŝmed > s
maj.
Finally, notice that in Example 3, a rule with s below smaj (s=6) emerges as self-stable,
along with others involving values above majority.14 Excluding these low value rules a priori
will deprive us of knowing all possible stable arrangements, when they exist.
Self-Stable Constitutions
As we have seen so far, self-stable voting rules will exist for many, but not all, societies.
Does this mean we should take the possibility that a society might not ﬁnd a self-stable rule
as a serious threat to the stability of decision making? One answer is that this possibility
of instability helps explain why many (if not most) societies resort to special rules when it
comes to changing the voting rules. This motivates an analysis of self-stable constitutions.
Existence is now guaranteed.
Theorem 4 For any society, the constitutions (smaj, n) and (ŝmed, S) for any S ≥ smaj are
self-stable.
Theorem 4 follows is a straightforward consequence of our results on intermediate prefer-
ences (Lemma 2) and on relative positioning of voter’s peaks (Lemma 3), and so we simply
oﬀer a description of the proof as follows. The self-stability of (smaj, n) follows from the
observation that by Lemmas 3 and 2 there is always at least one voter who will wish to keep
the voting rule over issues no higher than smaj and at least one who will wish to keep the
voting rule no lower than smaj. Thus, there is no unanimous consent to raise or lower the
voting rule from smaj. The self-stability of (ŝmed, S) with S ≥ smaj follows from Lemma 2
and the deﬁnition of ŝmed, as by intermediate preferences fewer than n/2 voters will prefer
14Moreover, there exist examples where the only self-stable rules are sub-majority rules. For example, con-
sider a dichotomous society with N1 = {1, 2} and N2 = {3, . . . , 7} with p1 = .3 and p2 = .5. Straightforward
calculations lead to ŝ1 = 5 and ŝ2 = 3. There s = 3 is the only self-stable rule.
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to raise the voting rule from ŝmed, and similarly fewer than n/2 voters will prefer to lower
the voting rule from ŝmed.
Theorem 4 is essentially tight in the sense that for any (s, S) that does not coincide
with either (smaj, n) or (ŝmed, S) with S ≥ smaj, there is some situations in which (s, S) is
not self-stable (with a single exception that (smaj, n− 1) is always self-stable whenever n is
odd).15 Let us be more explicit. First, consider (s, S) with some s = smaj. If p is such that
pi = pj for all i and j then ŝi = s
maj for all i and so any (s, S) for which s = smaj = ŝmed will
be unstable regardless of S. So we need only consider (s, S) where s = smaj or s = ŝmed. We
can see the problem with (ŝmed, S) where S < s
maj from Example 3, as it is possible to have
societies where a near majority prefers to move the voting rule away from ŝmed.
16 Finally,
when considering (smaj, S) with S < n (S < n−1 if n is odd), consider a society where voter
1 has p1 near 0 (and the same for voter 2 in the case of n being odd), and all other voters
have the same pi near 1. For high enough pi, voters i will have probability greater than 1/2
of supporting change when there are n/2 supporters of change if n is even and when there
are (n − 1)/2 supporters of change when n is odd. This leads to peaks of smaj − 1 for the
voters with pi near 1, and so they will vote to decrease the voting rule if it is set at s
maj.
In summary. For each society, there will always be at least two self-stable constitutions
(three when n is odd).
Although we have treated the constitutions (smaj, n) and (ŝmed, S) on equal footing in
the statement of Theorem 4, notice the following essential diﬀerence. The constitution
(ŝmed, S) varies across societies, since ŝmed depends on the distribution of pi’s. On the other
hand, (smaj, n) is the same across all societies of the same size. Hence, (smaj, n) is a stable
constitution regardless of the society, while a constitution of the form (ŝmed, S) is by deﬁnition
tailored to a speciﬁc society.
Majority Rule Constitutions
The self-stability of constitutions using majority rule as a voting is of particular interest
because of the prominence of majority rule in actual constitutions and its special properties
including overall eﬃciency (Theorem 4). We have just seen that the particular constitution
(smaj, n) is self-stable for any society.
We now explore the conditions on the distribution of pi’s that are suﬃcient for other
constitutions (smaj, S) to be self-stable for values of S < n.
Let us say a couple of words about why we should care about these constitutions. Here,
we have not modeled why a society should every want to set S < n. Nevertheless, soci-
eties do desire ﬂexibility and we see that most constitutions allow for the real possibility of
amendment. Regardless of their motivation, we are still interested in understanding which
15Note that any Pareto optimal s is stable when put together with n. The claim here is that smaj is the
only s that is Pareto optimal for all societies.
16More generally, consider a society with a single voter who has the median preferences and other voters
who have extreme pi’s near 0 and 1, who will prefer to lower or raise the voting rule. In particular, the voters
with pi’s near enough to 1 will prefer an s < ŝmed over ŝmed and there will be at least smaj − 1 such voters.
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constitutions are self-stable, as those are the ones that we should expect to last for “long” pe-
riods of time; where “long” is relative to the length of time that a society has some continuity
in its views.
It is important to note that Example 3 provides an example where a constitution of
(smaj, 2
3
n) is not self-stable. There, 11 of the 16 agents would prefer to lower the voting role
to be below smaj. Thus, there are simple situations where seemingly natural constitutions
are not self-stable. The following theorem provides a characterization of which constitutions
involving majority rule are self-stable, as a function of the society.
Let zi =
pi
1−pi . Thus, zi represents the ratio of the probability that i supports change
compared to the probability that i supports the status quo. Any positive number is a
potential zi.
Theorem 5 For any society with even n the constitution (smaj, S) is self-stable if
S > |{i : ∑
C⊂N,|C|=n
2
,i∈C
(×j∈Czj) ≥
∑
C⊂N,|C|=n
2
,i/∈C
(×j∈Czj)}| > n− S. (3)
Note that (3) can be rewritten as
S > |{i : zi ≥
∑
k 	=i
λikzk}| > n− S, (4)
where
λik =
2
n
∑
|C|=n
2
−1;i,k/∈C(×j∈Czj)∑
|C|=n
2
−1;i/∈C,(×j∈Czj)
.
Here, the λik are weights such that
∑
k 	=i λik = 1, and so
∑
k 	=i λikzk is a weighted average of
zk’s over k’s other than i. Thus, (4) says roughly that the number of voters with above
average zi’s is not too high and not too low. It can be shown that this is also equivalent to
having the number of voters with below average zi’s not be too high or too low.
Condition (3) is almost a necessary condition as well, except for the possibility that one
particular voter (the n − S-th voter when ordered in terms of decreasing pi’s) has peak
exactly at smaj which allows for a slightly weaker condition.
To see the implications of Theorem 5, let us consider the constitution where s′ = 2n/3.
That constitution is stable, provided there are at least 1/3 of the voters who do not wish to
raise the voting rule from smaj and at least 1/3 of the voters who do not wish to lower it from
smaj. The proof of the theorem involves showing that these are equivalent to the inequalities
relating the zi’s. The requirements of the theorem are then that at least 1/3 and no more
than 2/3 of the voters have a zi that is bigger than the weighted average of the other voters’
zi’s. This is in eﬀect a limitation on the skewness of the distribution of the zi’s (or, in eﬀect,
the pi’s). If the distribution of zi’s is not too skewed, then (s
maj, 2n/3) will be self-stable.
More generally, Theorem 5 provides the reasoning behind why a super-majority will be
required for rules changes in a constitution where majority rule is used for ordinary decisions.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Our research takes the view that ‘choosing how to choose’ is an issue that calls for the
treatment of institutions as endogenous variables at equilibrium, and not as exogenously
given data. Thus, we see it as part of a broad and ambitious research program of not only
understanding normative or positive properties of institutions and mechanisms, but also
how they come to take certain forms when individuals in the society have personal stakes in
the design of the institution and can aﬀect it. To some extent this presents a ‘chicken and
egg’ dilemma, as the existing institutional environment to a large extent determines what
institutional changes can take place, and are also the result of previous institutional change.
Economics has a tradition of dealing with problems of this kind by resorting to appropriate
ﬁxed-point and equilibrium notions, and self-stability can viewed in this light.
In order to study self-stability, we have considered a model that we realize is stylized on
many dimensions, such as taking the agenda to be a binary one, taking the agenda to be
exogenous, examining only anonymous voting rules, considering non-repeated environments,
and considering a ﬁxed population of voters. Nevertheless, we feel that it provides important
steps in modeling the very important process of how a society chooses the institutions that
it uses for governance. Relaxing some of these restrictions provides a rich agenda for further
research.
Anonymity
Anonymity has been presumed in our analysis through the deﬁnition of a voting rule:
every voter has an equal weight. But in many cases voters are not individuals with equal
rights. Rather, they may be countries of diﬀerent sizes (as in the council of the European
Union), or government agencies who contribute diﬀerently to a shared institution (as in the
IMF). In many such cases, diﬀerent voters get diﬀerent weights. Again, these weights may
eventually be changed through a vote. The analysis of self-stable constitutions for rules of
this type is important and certainly nontrivial, as shown by some initial results of Sosnowska
(2002). In a recent paper (Barbera and Jackson (2003)) we study alternative rationales for
the choice of weights, and their connection with the population variable.
Diﬀerent Rules for Diﬀerent Issues
Here we have analyzed a choice of a single voting rule. Generally, the diﬀerent types of
issues a society faces might have diﬀerent characteristics (for instance, diﬀerent voter pi’s),
and that might lead to diﬀerent choices of voting rules for diﬀerent issues. For instance, in
California propositions involving new bond issues are often held to higher majorities than
other propositions.17
Large Numbers
17See Tsebelis and Money (1997) for some interesting descriptions of variations on rules for diﬀerent sorts
of decisions.
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We have deliberately worked with ﬁnite societies for two reasons. First, there are many
applications where the society in question is small and not well approximated by an inﬁnite
society. Second, if one worked with a continuum society (or some other inﬁnite model), then,
without making additional assumptions about the distribution of the underlying uncertainty,
a (suitable) law of large numbers would eliminate the uncertainty over the proportion of
society supporting change over the status quo. This uncertainty is the critical aspect that
makes for non-degenerate and interesting voters’ preferences over voting rules.
While we chose to work with a ﬁnite model, it is still interesting to ask questions about
large societies.18 Example 3 extends when the society is replicated a large number of times,
and so general existence of self-stable voting rules will not come simply from considering
a large society. However, there may be some interesting conditions that are suﬃcient for
self-stability one can obtain from looking at large societies.19
Preferences
Assuming that a voter gets a utility of 1 when his preferred alternative is selected and
0 otherwise involves more than a normalization. Instead, it could be that when voter i
supports a then i gets utility 1 if a is selected and 0 if b is selected, while when voter i
supports b then i gets utility xi when b is selected and 0 if a is selected.
This more general setting leads to changes in the analysis in the following ways.
First, Lemma 1 on single-peaked preferences goes through unaltered and it is easily
checked that the proof works with only slight modiﬁcation.
Second, the extension of Lemma 2 on intermediate preferences is a more complicated
matter. There are now two characteristics that distinguish voters and so ﬁnding an ordering
on voters for which their preferences are intermediate is more delicate. In the case where
xi ≥ xj whenever pi ≥ pj (so that voters who are more likely to support alternative b
care relatively more about alternative b), preferences are still intermediate. Again, for this
situation the proof goes through with very little modiﬁcation. This would seem to be a
natural condition. However, if there is no such relationship between the xi’s and the pi’s,
then preferences may fail to be intermediate, and it is easy to construct counter-examples.
The existence of self-stable voting rules with dichotomous preferences, Theorem 2 (3),
depends on the property that a voter cares (in expectation, at least) similarly for having
a win when the voter supports a and having b win when the voter supports b. Without
that assumption, examples can be constructed where there does not exist a self-stable voting
rule. However, Theorem 2 (4) extends under an ordering that preserves the intermediate
preferences.
Another aspect of preferences that might be due for further consideration is the assump-
tion of the independence of the probabilities that the voters support change. This assumption
played a role in our proof of single-peakedness. Most importantly, this ensures that likelihood
18See Schoﬁeld (1971) for some calculations concerning voters’ preferences in large heterogeneous societies.
19One possibility is to think about conditions on the distributions of pi’s, in an analogous way that
conditions identiﬁed by Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988) on distributions of preferences suﬃce for an alternative
with nice properties in their setting.
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that a voter has that they support change conditional on k voters supporting change is be
monotone in k. With certain forms of correlation, this conditional probability may no longer
be monotone. While arbitrary forms of correlation could be diﬃcult to accommodate, there
are natural ones which still allow for such monotonicity and would thus still be tractable.
Empirical Investigations
As has been pointed out to us, one can test some of the ideas developed here rather
directly as follows. One could look at roll-call data from the U.S. Senate to see who voted
for proposed rules changes. One could then compare this to the votes by senators on previous
bills (which would provide an estimate of the various pi’s). Senators with relatively higher
propensities to support change, should also be opposing proposals (which have appeared
from time to time) to raise the rule for ending a debate and calling a vote from 6/10 to 2/3,
as this is eﬀectively an increase in s.
Of course, this is just one possible empirical investigation, and one that provides more
of a speciﬁc check on some of the predictions of the model. More generally, developing an
understanding of how the stability of a constitution relates to the underlying primitives of
the society provides a rich agenda for investigation.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Let Di(s) = Ui(s)− Ui(s− 1). From equation (2) it follows that
Di(s) = (1− pi)Pi(s− 1)− piPi(s− 2). (5)
Thus,
Di(s) = Pi(s− 1)(1− piPi(s− 1) + Pi(s− 2)
Pi(s− 1) ).
Note that Ui is single-peaked if there exists ŝi (possibly equal to 1 or n) such that Di(s) > 0
for every ŝi > s ≥ 2, Di(s) < 0 for every n ≥ s > ŝi, and Di(s) ≥ 0 at s = ŝi (with equality
holding only when there are twin peaks). Thus, if we can show that Di(s) has this form,
then we will have shown that Ui is single-peaked.
Note that the sign of Di(s) depends only on the size of
Pi(s−1)+Pi(s−2)
Pi(s−1) relative to
1
pi
. This
means that showing that Pi(s−1)+Pi(s−2)
Pi(s−1) is increasing in s for n ≥ s ≥ 2 establishes that Di(s)
has the form speciﬁed above. Rewriting
Pi(s− 1) + Pi(s− 2)
Pi(s− 1) = 1 +
Pi(s− 2)
Pi(s− 1) ,
means that we need only show that Pi(s−2)
Pi(s−1) is increasing
20 in s.
We follow a proof by induction on n. The case where n = 2 is trivial, since then
there is only one s that satisﬁes n ≥ s ≥ 2. Now for the induction step. Suppose that
Pi(s− 2)/Pi(s− 1) is increasing for any n′ ≥ s ≥ 2 for societies of size n− 1 ≥ n′. We show
that Pi(s− 2)/Pi(s− 1) is increasing for any n ≥ s ≥ 2.
Let
Pi,j(s) =
∑
C⊂N\{i,j}:|C|=s
×∈Cp ×k/∈C (1− pk).
Pi,j(s) is the probability that exactly s of the voters other than i and j support the change.
Pi(s− 2)
Pi(s− 1) =
pjPi,j(s− 3) + (1− pj)Pi,j(s− 2)
pjPi,j(s− 2) + (1− pj)Pi,j(s− 1) ,
20When we say “increasing” we refer to the strict sense, and we use the term “non-decreasing” to refer to
the weaker sense.
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where Pi,j(s− 3) = 0 when s = 2. Rewrite the above equality as
Pi(s− 2)
Pi(s− 1) =
pjPi,j(s− 3)
pjPi,j(s− 2) + (1− pj)Pi,j(s− 1) +
(1− pj)Pi,j(s− 2)
pjPi,j(s− 2) + (1− pj)Pi,j(s− 1) . (6)
We show that each term on the right hand side of (6) is increasing in s for n ≥ s ≥ 2.
Take the ﬁrst term. It is clear that since Pi,j(s − 3) = 0 when s = 2, that it is increasing
from s = 2 to s = 3. So, we need only show that its inverse is decreasing in s for n ≥ s ≥ 3.
pjPi,j(s− 2) + (1− pj)Pi,j(s− 1)
pjPi,j(s− 3) =
pjPi,j(s− 2)
pjPi,j(s− 3) +
(1− pj)
pj
Pi,j(s− 1)
Pi,j(s− 3)
=
pjPi,j(s− 2)
pjPi,j(s− 3) +
(1− pj)
pj
Pi,j(s− 1)
Pi,j(s− 2)
Pi,j(s− 2)
Pi,j(s− 3) . (7)
Note that the induction step implies that Pi,j(s−2)
Pi,j(s−3) is increasing in s for n ≥ s ≥ 3. So, each
expression on the right hand side is decreasing in s for each n− 1 ≥ s ≥ 3 by the induction
step, and so the overall expression is. So we only have to worry about the case where s = n
and the expression Pi,j(s−1)
Pi,j(s−2) . Note that Pi,j(n− 1) = 0, and so this follows as well.
Recall that the expression in (7) is the inverse of the ﬁrst term on the right hand side
of (6). A similar argument establishes that the second term on the right hand side of (6) is
increasing in s.
Proof of Lemma 2:
We ﬁrst show that Ui(s) ≥ Ui(s− 1) implies that Uj(s) ≥ Uj(s− 1) for any j such that
pj ≥ pi. Recall that
Ui(s)− Ui(s− 1) = (1− pi)Pi(s− 1)− piPi(s− 2).
So, we write
Ui(s)−Ui(s−1) = (1−pi)(Pi,j(s−2)pj+Pi,j(s−1)(1−pj))−pi(Pi,j(s−3)pj+Pi,j(s−2)(1−pj)).
Likewise,
Uj(s)−Uj(s−1) = (1−pj)(Pi,j(s−2)pi+Pi,j(s−1)(1−pi))−pj(Pi,j(s−3)pi+Pi,j(s−2)(1−pi)).
It follows that
[Ui(s)− Ui(s− 1)]− [Uj(s)− Uj(s− 1)] = 2(pj − pi)Pi,j(s− 2).
Notice that the right hand side of the above equation is nonnegative, because pj ≥ pi.
So, we have shown that
Ui(s)− Ui(s− 1) ≥ Uj(s)− Uj(s− 1), (8)
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whenever pj ≥ pi. Note that if s > s′, then
Ui(s)− Ui(s′) =
s∑
k=s′+1
Ui(k)− Ui(k − 1). (9)
So, (9) implies that
Ui(s)− Ui(s′) ≥ Uj(s)− Uj(s′), (10)
whenever pj ≥ pi, provided s > s′. This establishes that preferences satisfy the single-
crossing property.
We now show that this implies that preferences are intermediate.
First, consider the case where Ui(s) ≥ Ui(s′), Uj(s) ≥ Uj(s′), pj ≥ pk ≥ pi and s > s′.
Since Ui(s) ≥ Ui(s′) and pk ≥ pi, (10) implies that Uk(s) ≥ Uk(s′) (with strict inequality if
the strict inequality holds for i). So, the desired conclusion of intermediate preferences is
established for this case (and the corresponding strict inequality case). Next, consider the
case where Ui(s) ≥ Ui(s′), Uj(s) ≥ Uj(s′), pj ≥ pk ≥ pi and s < s′. Suppose to the contrary
that Uk(s
′) > Uk(s). Then since pj ≥ pk it follows from (10) (applied with the roles of s and s′
reversed) that Uj(s
′) > Uj(s), which is a contradiction. Thus, our supposition was incorrect
and so Uk(s) ≥ Uk(s′). Finally, consider the case where Ui(s) > Ui(s′), Uj(s) > Uj(s′),
pj ≥ pk ≥ pi and s < s′. Suppose to the contrary that Uk(s′) ≥ Uk(s). Then since pj ≥ pk it
follows from (10) (applied with the roles of s and s′ reversed) that Uj(s′) ≥ Uj(s), which is
a contradiction. Thus, our supposition was incorrect and so Uk(s) > Uk(s
′). We have shown
that preferences are intermediate.
Proof of Lemma 3:smaj maximizes total societal welfare (Theorem 4). Consider the case
where some voter j’s peak is greater than smaj. So, Uj(s
maj+1) ≥ Uj(smaj). As∑i Ui(smaj) >∑
i Ui(s
maj + 1), it follows that there exists some i with Ui(s
maj + 1) < Ui(s
maj) which by
single-peaked preferences (Lemma 1) implies that smaj ≥ ŝi. We are left with the case where
all voters’ peaks are no more than smaj. Suppose to the contrary of Lemma 3 that all the
peaks are strictly less than smaj. By the single-peakedness of preferences, this implies that
Ui(s
maj − 1) > Ui(smaj) for all i, which contradicts the fact that smaj maximizes ∑i Ui(s).
Thus our supposition was incorrect and the Lemma is established.
Proof of Theorem 2: The proofs for (1), (2), and (4) appear in the text. Let us prove (3).
Let n2 = #N2 and n1 = #N1, and without loss of generality take p1 ≥ p2.
In the case where p1 = p2 it is easily checked that all preferences are identical with
ŝi = n/2 + 1 if n is even, and ŝi = (n + 1)/2 if n is odd. In that case, ŝi is self-stable. So,
we consider the case where p1 > p2, n1 ≥ 1, and n2 ≥ 1.
Lemma 3 and Corollary 1 implies that ŝ2 ≥ smaj ≥ ŝ1, since p2 < p1. If n2 ≥ smaj, then
it must be that smaj > n1 and so ŝ2 is self-stable. Therefore, we need only examine the case
where n1 ≥ smaj > n2.
Suppose to the contrary that there is no self-stable voting rule. It must be that n2 ≥ ŝ1
and n1 ≥ ŝ2. Thus,
n1 ≥ ŝ2 ≥ smaj > n2 ≥ ŝ1 (11)
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and p2 < p1.
For k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let qbi (k) be the probability that a voter of type i ∈ {1, 2} supports b
conditional on knowing that k voters support b. Correspondingly, let qai (k) be the probability
that a voter of type i ∈ {1, 2} supports a conditional on knowing that k voters support a.
By the deﬁnition of qai and q
b
i it follows that
qai (k) = 1− qbi (n− k). (12)
Note that i’s peak is the largest s′ such that qbi (s
′) ≥ 1/2 and 1/2 ≥ qbi (s) for s < s′.
Below we will establish that
qa2(k)
k
>
qa2(k + 1)
(k + 1)
. (13)
Before proving (13), let us argue that this will complete the proof. Since qb2(ŝ2) ≥ 1/2 it
follows that 1/2 ≥ qa2(n− ŝ2). So, by (13) (applied iteratively) it follows that
1/2 > qa2(n− ŝ1)
n− ŝ2
n− ŝ1 .
From the inequality above, we then have
n2qa2(n− ŝ1) <
n2
2
n− ŝ1
n− ŝ2 .
Since it must be that n1q
a
1(n− s) + n2qa2(n− s) = n− s, it follows that
n1q
a
1(n− ŝ1) > n− ŝ1 −
n2
2
n− ŝ1
n− ŝ2 .
Noting that n − ŝ1 ≥ n1 (recall that n1 + n2 = n and n2 ≥ ŝ1 from inequality (11)), the
previous inequality requires that
qa1(n− ŝ1) > 1−
n2
2(n− ŝ2) .
Since n − ŝ2 ≥ n2 (recall that n1 + n2 = n and n1 ≥ ŝ2 from inequality (11)), the above
inequality implies that qa1(n− ŝ1) > 1/2. By the deﬁnition of ŝ1 we know that qb1(ŝ1) ≥ 1/2,
but then qa1(n− ŝ1) > 1/2 contradicts equation (12).
Now, we complete the proof by showing that (13) holds. Let P a(n′, k) denote the proba-
bility that, in a society with n1 voters with p1 and n
′ voters with p2, exactly k of the voters
support a. So in this calculation, the number of voters of type 1 is always ﬁxed, but the
number of voters of type 2 is given by n′. Writing in the expressions for qa2 from Bayes’ rule,
we need to show that
1
k
(
(1− p2)P a(n2 − 1, k − 1)
p2P a(n2 − 1, k) + (1− p2)P a(n2 − 1, k − 1)
)
>
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1k + 1
(
(1− p2)P a(n2 − 1, k)
p2P a(n2 − 1, k + 1) + (1− p2)P a(n2 − 1, k)
)
. (14)
Note that
P a(n′, k) = p2P a(n′ − 1, k) + (1− p2)P a(n′ − 1, k − 1). (15)
So substituting from (15) and simplifying, we rewrite (14) as
(k + 1)
P a(n2 − 1, k − 1)
P a(n2, k)
> k
P a(n2 − 1, k)
P a(n2, k + 1)
. (16)
We show this by induction on n2. A straightforward (but tedious) expansion of the expres-
sions (that we leave to the reader) veriﬁes that (16) holds for n2 = 1 and any k ≥ 1 (set
Pa(n2,k)
Pa(n2,k+1)
= 0/0 = 1 when k > n1 + n2). We now show that if (16) holds for each n2 < n′
and k ≥ 1, then it holds for n′ and any k ≥ 1. Rewriting (16) at n′ and expanding using
(15) in each expression we obtain,
(k + 1)
(
p22P
a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k + 1) + p2(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k)
+p2(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 1, k + 1) + (1− p2)2P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 1, k)
)
> k
(
p22P
a(n′ − 2, k)P a(n′ − 1, k) + p2(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k)P a(n′ − 1, k − 1)
+p2(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k) + (1− p2)2P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k − 1)
)
Using the induction hypothesis, we eliminate the ﬁrst expression on each side of the inequal-
ity, and then collecting terms and simplifying we obtain
p2P
a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k) + (k + 1)p2P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 1, k + 1)
+(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 1, k)
> kp2P
a(n′ − 2, k)P a(n′ − 1, k − 1) + (1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k − 1)
Now, substituting for P a(n′ − 1, ·) from (15), we rewrite the above as
p22P
a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 2, k) + p2(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)
+p2(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 2, k) + (1− p2)2P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)
+(k+1)p22P
a(n′− 2, k− 2)P a(n′− 2, k+1)+ (k+1)p2(1− p2)P a(n′− 2, k− 2)P a(n′− 2, k)
> p2(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1) + (1− p2)2P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)
+kp22P
a(n′ − 2, k)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1) + kp2(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k)P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)
Simplifying, we must only show the inequality
(k + 1)p2P
a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 2, k + 1) + (k + 1)(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 2, k)
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> (k − 1)p2P a(n′ − 2, k)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1) + (k − 1)(1− p2)P a(n′ − 2, k)P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)
Using (15) at n′ − 1 we rewrite this as
(k + 1)P a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 1, k + 1) > (k − 1)P a(n′ − 2, k)P a(n′ − 1, k − 1). (17)
So we need only show that (17) holds. By the induction hypothesis, we know that
(k + 1)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k + 1) > kP a(n′ − 2, k)P a(n′ − 1, k),
and
kP a(n′ − 2, k − 2)P a(n′ − 1, k) > (k − 1)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k − 1),
or
kP a(n′ − 1, k) > (k − 1)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k − 1)/P a(n′ − 2, k − 2).
Combined, these imply that
(k + 1)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k + 1)
> P a(n′ − 2, k)(k − 1)P a(n′ − 2, k − 1)P a(n′ − 1, k − 1)/P a(n′ − 2, k − 2),
which simpliﬁes to
(k + 1)P a(n′ − 1, k + 1)P a(n′ − 2, k − 2) > (k − 1)P a(n′ − 2, k)P a(n′ − 1, k − 1).
This veriﬁes that (17) holds and completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5: First, note that given the single-peaked preferences (accounting for
the possibility of two peaks), (smaj, S) is self-stable if and only if
|{i : Ui(smaj) ≥ Ui(smaj − 1)}| > n− S and |{i : Ui(smaj) ≥ Ui(smaj + 1)}| > n− S. (18)
A suﬃcient condition for this is that
|{i : Ui(smaj) ≥ Ui(smaj − 1)}| > n− S and |{i : Ui(smaj − 1) ≥ Ui(smaj)}| > n− S.
which is in turn guaranteed by
S > |{i : Ui(smaj − 1) ≥ Ui(smaj)}| > n− S. (19)
Recall from (2) that
Ui(s)− Ui(s− 1) = (1− pi)Pi(s− 1)− piPi(s− 2).
Thus,
{i : Ui(smaj − 1) ≥ Ui(smaj)} =
{
i :
pi
1− pi = zi ≥
Pi(s
maj − 1)
Pi(smaj − 2)
}
. (20)
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From the deﬁnition of Pi(s) it follows that
Pi(s)
Pi(s− 1) =
∑
C⊂N\i,|C|=s [×j∈Cpj ×j /∈C (1− pj)]∑
C⊂N\i,|C|=s−1 [×j∈Cpj ×j /∈C (1− pj)]
Dividing top and bottom by ×j 	=i(1− pj), this becomes
Pi(s)
Pi(s− 1) =
∑
C⊂N\i,|C|=s×j∈Czj∑
C⊂N\i,|C|=s−1×j∈Czj
So, by the above equation and (20), we can rewrite (19) as
S > |{i : zi ≥
∑
C⊂N\i,|C|=n
2
×j∈Czj∑
C⊂N\i,|C|=n
2
−1×j∈Czj
}| > n− S. (21)
This can be rewritten as
S > |{i : ∑
C⊂N,i∈C,|C|=n
2
×j∈Czj ≥
∑
C⊂N\i,|C|=n
2
×j∈Czj}| > n− S,
which is the claimed expression.
A direct rewriting of (21) leads to the claimed expression in (4):
S > |{i : zi ≥
∑
k 	=i
λikzk}| > n− S,
where
λik =
2
n
∑
|C|=n
2
−1;i,k/∈C(×j∈Czj)∑
|C|=n
2
−1;i/∈C(×j∈Czj)
.
Direct inspection shows that
∑
k 	=i λik = 1 for all i.
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